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Run and manage H Company's Computer-Use Agents from any MCP client.
Do not connect
The assessed surface is high-risk. Remediate the findings before connecting.
Scanned 8 days ago Due for re-check
A server can change after it's graded. Re-run the automated scan to refresh this report.
This grade is deterministic and reproducible: the same server surface always yields the same grade under a given algorithm version. It is a real automated assessment computed by the MCPGrade engine from what the probe actually observed — not a fabricated or opinion score. It is not a manual human pentest, so it can miss context-specific risks.
Every signal below was measured directly by the automated probe. The grade is derived only from evidence like this — nothing is assumed.
The hai-agents MCP server exposes 9 tools, focused primarily on filesystem and communication capabilities. Its published description reads: "Run and manage H Company's Computer-Use Agents from any MCP client". It communicates over Streamable HTTP using the 2025-06-18 protocol revision, and does not require authorization to connect. MCPGrade currently rates hai-agents D — the assessed surface is high-risk and should be remediated before use. Its most notable findings include "Cross-tool shadowing" and "No authorization on a public remote server". This report is a deterministic, reproducible automated assessment: the same observed surface always yields the same grade under a given algorithm version, and it is refreshed as new scans arrive and free to read — but it is not a substitute for a manual human security review. Always re-check hai-agents's advertised tools, transport security, and authorization posture before connecting an autonomous agent or sharing sensitive context with it.
Add hai-agents to an MCP client using the endpoint below. Review the grade and findings above before granting an autonomous agent access.
MCP endpoint
https://agp.eu.hcompany.ai/mcpStreamable HTTP transport. This is the MCP endpoint, not a website — paste it into your MCP client server list rather than a browser.
Captured passively during the read-only scan. Click any value to find servers that match it.
The tools this server advertises via tools/list — names, purposes, and the parameters each accepts, exactly as enumerated read-only.
Start an agent on a task; return the answer or a session handle to wait on. ``agent`` from list_agents.
Poll a session: with ``wait`` long-poll for the answer, else return the current snapshot.
List agents the caller can run: their org's agents plus the public ``h/`` ones.
Sorted worst-first. Each finding shows its severity, what it means, its OWASP MCP Top-10 mapping, and a recommended fix — the check id links to the exact methodology row that produced it.
tool: run_agent
A tool description tries to alter the model’s use of another tool.
``agent`` from list_agents.RecommendationDescriptions must describe only their own tool.
The server accepts tool enumeration (and likely invocation) with no authentication.
RecommendationRequire OAuth 2.1 authorization for any server exposing non-public tools.
tool: send_message
The server advertises open-world / broadly-scoped capabilities.
no annotations on write-capable tool "send_message"RecommendationScope tools to the minimum needed.
tool: list_files
The server advertises open-world / broadly-scoped capabilities.
no annotations on write-capable tool "list_files"RecommendationScope tools to the minimum needed.
tool: list_files
One tool both accesses the filesystem and reaches the network. Combining two capability classes in a single tool widens its blast radius and is the substrate for confused-deputy and exfiltration abuse.
list_files List files on a browser session's machine (e.g. downloads)RecommendationSeparate filesystem and network capabilities into distinct, independently-scoped tools.
tool: list_files
A filesystem tool exposes a path parameter that is a free-form string with no pattern/enum/format constraint, so it accepts absolute paths and "../" traversal. A tool that constrains its path (a rooted `pattern` or an `enum`) does not fire.
unconstrained path parameter "path"RecommendationConstrain the path parameter to a rooted allow-list and reject absolute/traversal paths server-side.
tool: read_file
A filesystem tool exposes a path parameter that is a free-form string with no pattern/enum/format constraint, so it accepts absolute paths and "../" traversal. A tool that constrains its path (a rooted `pattern` or an `enum`) does not fire.
unconstrained path parameter "path"RecommendationConstrain the path parameter to a rooted allow-list and reject absolute/traversal paths server-side.
tool: write_file
The server advertises open-world / broadly-scoped capabilities.
no annotations on write-capable tool "write_file"RecommendationScope tools to the minimum needed.
Financial data service providing fundamental information for 30,000+ listed companies across the US, Japan, and Korea, sourced directly from SEC, EDINET, and DART regulatory filings.
Search tours, attraction tickets, and holiday packages across 24 countries.
Agentic visitor analytics with five tools for CRO and session analysis.
52 paid x402 API endpoints for AI agents — crypto, data, DeFi, and market intelligence, settled on Base.
Access Vonage API documentation, code snippets, tutorials, and troubleshooting resources.
Send a follow-up message to a running session.
Cancel a session; a no-op if it does not exist or already finished.
Make a session publicly readable and return its absolute share URL.
List files on a browser session's machine (e.g. downloads), newest first. When a listing is truncated, page on the last entry's modified_at (ISO-8601) and name, passed as modified_before and name_afte
Read a file from a browser session's machine; returns base64 content and metadata.
Write base64-encoded content to a file on a browser session's machine.