Hunter view of governance, bridges, and L2 trust. Read three public write-ups. No live probing.
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A DeFi governance attack is usually not “smart people voted wrong.” It is temporary voting power, missing delay, or a message that was never authenticated — used to change outcomes or move funds. This Andrax tutorial — by Syed Zada Abrar — covers ~80% theory, ~20% report-reading lab.
Prerequisites: DeFi Flash Loan Attacks Explained; Oracle Manipulation in Smart Contracts; ERC-4626 Vault Security: Share Inflation & Donation Attacks; EIP-712 & Signature Replay; Proxy, UUPS & Storage Collision. Also useful: Hub; Spoke 01; Access Control Bugs.
Ethics fence: this spoke is report reading and checklist thinking. Study public post-mortems and primary docs. Do not probe live bridges, vote with flash-loan capital on mainnet, spam sequencers, or “confirm” a governance path against a live DAO. Immunefi rules ban mainnet and public-testnet testing of in-scope code. Lab = reading only.
| Surface | What hunters often miss | Typical impact class (Immunefi IVS, Smart Contracts) |
|---|---|---|
| Governance | Flash-loan votes without snapshot / delay; emergency paths | Critical includes “manipulation of governance voting result… resulting in a direct change” (IVS v2.3) |
| Bridges | Message auth, root defaults, upgrade-time init | Direct theft / unauthorized mint of bridged assets |
| L2 | Sequencer ordering, force-inclusion latency, messenger checks | Often out of scope as “sequencer downtime” on some bounty pages — still matters for design review (Sherlock validity criteria) |
| ERC-4337 (add-on) | Signature not bound to userOpHash / chainId / EntryPoint | Cross-chain or cross-EntryPoint replay (EIP-4337) |
Impact labels always follow the program’s in-scope list, not this table alone.
OpenZeppelin-style Governors and custom DAOs share a pattern: who can propose, who can vote, when execution is allowed. A hunter checklist:
block.number, checkpoint/snapshot, or live balanceOf? Live balance + same-block flash liquidity is the Beanstalk-shaped failure.emergencyCommit (or equivalent) collapses the delay when a threshold is met, flash capital can finish the job in one transaction.Flash loans amplify. They are not the root bug. The root is missing time preference (snapshot or delay) between acquiring votes and executing irreversible effects. See flash loans.
Public post-mortem (governance): Beanstalk — REKT (18 April 2022). Pattern: flash-loan temporary voting power + malicious proposal + immediate emergencyCommit-style path. Read for the sequence and the missing delay, not for copy-paste txs. Dollar figures on rekt.news are that site’s reporting — do not invent new ones; quote only if you need them with the URL.
A bridge is a system that says “this event happened on chain A, so do X on chain B.” Hunters care about:
| Check | Failure mode |
|---|---|
| Who attests? | Single verifier / single DVN / undersigned guardian set |
| What is proven? | Merkle root, light-client, optimistic timeout, ZK proof |
| Default / zero values | Unset mapping entries that acceptableRoot-style logic treats as valid |
| Replay | Same message hash processable twice; missing nonce / processed flag |
| Upgrade / initialize | Init that pre-approves bytes32(0) or a trusted root incorrectly |
| Destination effect | Mint, unlock, or call arbitrary target on “verified” message |
Bridge replay attack explained (hunter sense): either (a) a message already processed is accepted again, or (b) a message that was never proven is treated as proven because of a default root / status. Nomad’s 2022 failure was closer to (b): unproven messages passed authentication after an upgrade-time initialization nuance.
Public post-mortem (bridge): Nomad Bridge — REKT (2 August 2022) for the incident narrative; Nomad’s own Root Cause Analysis for the Replica / acceptableRoot / confirmAt[bytes32(0)] mechanism. Lab = read both. Do not open a live Nomad (or any) bridge UI to “try” process.
When you file a bridge finding later: show the auth gap on a local fork / CTF / in-scope PoC rules, name the exact function, and map impact to the program’s IVS line (theft of bridged assets, unauthorized mint, etc.). No mainnet forge.
On optimistic and many ZK rollups, a sequencer orders transactions, soft-confirms them, and posts batches. Soft confirmation is not L1 finality. For contracts, that implies:
msg.sender is the messenger and xDomainMessageSender() is the expected L1 sender; account for address aliasing on OP Stack where documented.block.number / block.timestamp semantics differ by L2 — verify before porting L1 logic.OP Stack public docs: Sequencer outages and Forced transaction. Read them as the L2 “primary source” for this lab: what users can do when the sequencer is unavailable, and what latency to expect. Track decentralization stage on L2BEAT without inventing TVL or stage counts in copy.
Bounty realism: Sherlock’s public validity list treats issues that rely on sequencers going offline or malfunctioning as invalid by default (criteria, item on sequencers). So “sequencer can censor me” is often a design assumption note for architects, not a paid Critical — unless the program explicitly scopes sequencer / centralized operator risk. Always read the program page.
EIP-4337 routes UserOperations through an EntryPoint. For auditors:
signature MUST depend on chainid and the EntryPoint address (spec anti-replay). Prefer validating the EntryPoint-provided userOpHash, which already binds those fields — do not re-hash only callData.validateUserOp must gate on a trusted EntryPoint; other functions should be EntryPoint-gated (or self).validatePaymasterUserOp that do not constrain execution / postOp invite griefing or unintended sponsorship.msg.sender on chain A equals the same person on chain B for AA wallets — destination address should be explicit.This spoke does not ship an ERC-4337 lab. Treat the list as review prompts. Signature-domain thinking overlaps EIP-712 replay.
Goal: one note card each for governance, bridge, and L2. No Anvil fork of the incident. No mainnet calls.
| Slot | Source | Write five lines |
|---|---|---|
| Governance | Beanstalk — REKT | Voting power source; delay/emergency path; what execution moved; flash-loan role (amplifier); one hunter check you would add to a Governor review |
| Bridge | Nomad — REKT + Nomad RCA | Auth function; zero/default root behavior; upgrade/init role; why Watchers did not catch SC bug (per RCA); one PoC idea you would run only on a local toy Replica |
| L2 | OP Stack outages + Forced transaction | What force-inclusion is for; why soft confirm ≠ finality; one contract pattern that breaks if inclusion is delayed; whether a bounty would pay (check a real program’s OOS list later — do not spam) |
ILLUSTRATIVE note card template:
Incident / doc:
Root cause in one sentence:
Trust assumption that failed:
Would this be in-scope on a typical Immunefi SC program? (yes/no/depends — why)
Local-only follow-up I will NOT run on mainnet:
acceptableRoot (or equivalent) returns true, processed-set behavior — local fork under program rules.userOpHash / domain binding gap with a local EntryPoint test.| Trap | Better habit |
|---|---|
| “Flash loan = governance Critical” | Show missing snapshot/delay + executable impact |
| Replaying a historical bridge exploit live | Read post-mortem; PoC only local / scoped |
| Filing “sequencer can censor” as Critical everywhere | Read program OOS; Sherlock default invalidates many of these |
| Assuming AA address equals EOA across chains | Explicit destination + chain-bound signatures |
Skipping messenger xDomainMessageSender | Both checks, plus alias where the stack requires it |
Educational content by Syed Zada Abrar for Andrax (andraxpentester.in). Authorized research only. Lab is public post-mortem / docs reading only — ILLUSTRATIVE study notes, not live probing.
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